TACTICAL USE AND ABUSE OF DEPOSITIONS UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES by unknown
TACTICAL USE AND ABUSE OF DEPOSITIONS
UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES"
PRIOR to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 pre-
trial discovery was comparatively rare in the federal courts.' Adequate ma-
chinery for unearthing facts and paring issues down to those actually in dis-
pute was sorely lacking. Lawyers often proceeded to trial with only the
slightest knowledge of their opponent's case. Only in the courtroom could
they determine whether their clients should have settled long before. The
outcome of litigation often hinged on the ability of counsel to produce sur-
prise evidence and their deftness at countering the tricks of their opponents.2
The new Rules sought to replace this ordeal of legal wit by a clear and
relatively easy method of getting at the facts as soon as possible after an ac-
tion was instituted.3 Added reason for the change lay in the adoption of a
new approach to pleading which was simple in form but short on information.
To meet these needs, Rules 26 through 375 provided for depositions, inter-
* Much of the material in this comment is the product of interviews with judges,
lawyers and stenographic reporters. Because of the confidential nature of the matters dis-
cussed in these interviews no documentation can be made of views stemming from per-
sonal experience or of cases not published in official reports. However, no material has
been included which has not be corroborated by the experience of others. Among those
interviewed have been judges on the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the District
Court for the Southern District of New York, the Court of Appeals of the State of New
York, the Appellate Division for the First Department of the State of New York; four-
teen practicing lawyers in New York City; and five stenographic reporters in New York
City and New Haven, Conn. Original statistics have come from the Docket Files for
the District Courts for the Southern District of New York and the District of Connecti-
cut, and from the records kept by stenographic reporters in New York City and New
Haven, Conn.
1. See 2 Moomx FEDERAL PRac'cE 2445-55 (1st ed. 1938); Dv-n-Ssrrx, FEDERAL
ExAINATioNs BEFoRE TRIAL § 58 (1939). The depositions available in the federal courts
prior to the new Rules fell into narrowly defined categories, virtually unchanged since the
Judiciary Act of 1789. These are discussed in Note, 96 U. oF PA. L. REv. 241 (1947).
2. KocH, DEPosmoNs AND DIscovERY UNDER THE FmERAL RuLEs, 1-2 (Practising
Law Institute, Trial Practice Series Monograph No. 8, 1946).
3. Typical of this new approach is the statement in Burton v. Weyerhaeuser Timber
Co., 1 F.R.D. 571, 573 (D. Ore. 1941), where defenses raised at the trial were not dis-
closed during a pre-trial conference: "I can sympathize with the desire of counsel, experi-
enced in the older forms of practice, to withhold disclosure of such dramatic issues until
the midst of trial, but it must be made clear that surprise, both as a weapon of attack and
defense, is not to be tolerated under the new Federal procedure".
4. Originally, bills of particulars were continued under the Rules as a compromise
solution to the frequent inadequacy of the new "notice pleading." But these were elimi-
nated in the 1948 amendments, leaving only the discovery mechanism to fill gaps in the
pleadings. 2 Moomr, FEDERAL PRAcrxcn 12.17. (2d ed. 1948).
5. The background and scope of the deposition-discovery procedure is thoroughly
discussed in Pike & Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure, 38 Co.
L. Rxv. 1179, 1436 (1938). For a survey of the tools of discovery available under the Fed-
eral Rules, see Holtzoff, Instruments of Discovery under Federal Rules of Chil Proce-
dure, 41 MIcH. L. REv. 205 (1942).
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rogatories, physical examinations, production of documents, and admissions.0
Of these the deposition machinery is the most significant. 7  Not only does it
6. The following chart indicates the use of pre-trial discovery devices in actions in-
stituted in a typical federal district. It displays the varying demand for different discovery
mechanisms in the major categories of actions. The chart is based on all cases docketed
between Aug. 29, 1946, and Oct. 16, 1948, in the District Court for the District of Con-
necticut. Figures under the classifications of actions indicate the relative volume of cases
of each type docketed from July 1, 1947, through June 30, 1948.
Percentage of Cases of Various Types Employing Discovery Dovices
-100 = Deposiions ] Interogatories []Discovery of Documenta Requo h or Adnibsokc
-50
Motor Other Fed. Tort Insurance Other
Vehicle Negligence Claims 2.2% Contract
8.2% 2.6% 4.90 24.0%7o
100
so
O.P.A. F.L.S.A. Copy- Patent Others
15.4% 3.0% right 3.0% 36.070
.7%
7. The use of depositions became the largest single interlocutory proceeding in cases
in the federal courts soon after the Rules were adopted. STOCXMAN, SOME STATISTICAL
OBSERVATIONS ON THE OPERATION OF DISCOVERY AND RELATED PROVISIONS OF THE ]FED-
ERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 21 (unpublished study in the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts, 1942).
Distribution of Interlocutory Proceedings
Numnber* Per Cent
1938 1941 1938 1941
Bills of Particularst 325 312 57.4 20.1
Depositions 102 507 18.0 32.6
Inspection 40 76 7.1 4.9
Depositions and Inspection 109 7.0
Interrogatories 12 72 2.1 4.9
Admissions 15 28 2.6 1.9
Physical and Mental
Examination 22 28 8.8 4.6
Summary Judgment 50 71 3.9 1.8
Pre-trial Conference 252 16.2
Total 566 1455
* These figures computed from a survey of 776 cases in 1938 and 713 cases in 1941.
Id. at 3.
t Bills of Particulars were eliminated from federal practice by the amendment ofRule 12(b), effective in 1948. 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 12.17 (2d ed. 1948).
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provide discovery, but it also serves in other important capacities: preserving
the testimony of witnesses who might be unavailable to testify at the time of
trial ;s providing a check on adverse witnesses who might try to change their
testimony in the courtroom;9 enabling judges to simplify issues and matters
of proof in pre-trial conferences;1O° and supporting motions for summary
judgment."
The provisions of Rule 26 for the taking of depositions are liberally
drawn.12  They permit examination of any person or party before trial, and
In 1938, proceedings for depositions were instituted in 10.6% of all cases docketed in
New York, while in 1941 they were instituted in 31.8% (or 38.9%, note 9 infra) of the
cases. STocsAx, op. cit. supra, at 27. Precise current statistics cannot satisfactorily be
determined from the docket files since parties often waive the requirement of filing notice
and copies of the deposition with the clerk of the court; however, compare chart in note
6 supra.
8. Rule 26(d). In some instances this has worked in reverse, excusing the appear-
ance of a witness at trial on the ground that his prior deposition was sufficient to meet
the evidentiary needs at trial. Moffett v. Arabian American Oil Co., 8 F.R.D. 566
(S.D.N.Y. 1948) (70-year-old witness who lived in Texas excused from action in New
York).
9. Both contradiction of witnesses and perpetuation of testimony require introduction
of the deposition into evidence at trial. In New York, in 1941, depositions were introduced
in 12.3% of all cases in which proceedings to take depositions were instituted:
(A) (B) (C)
Percentage
Percentage of (A) is which Percentage of
of cases in which depositions were all cases in which
depositions taken introduced at trial depositions introduccdt
All cases 31.8* 12.3 4.8
Jones Act 35.6 13.2 4.7
Negligence 47.9 10.8 5.2
Contract 43.2 12.7 5.5
Others 222 13.3 32
*This figure may be erroneous. Cross computations based on other tables in Stock-
man's paper indicate that it should be 38.9%.
tIn considering these figures it must be borne in mind that few cases reach the trial






All figures computed from STocXMAN, op. cit. stpra note 7, at 4, 11, 27, 37, 38.
10. Pre-trial conferences are provided for by Rule 16. For a discussion of the opera-
tion of pre-trial conferences and the role that depositions play in them, see 3 Mo4n,
FEmRA. PRAcricE 1102-39 (2d ed. 1948).
11. Although the use of depositions as supporting affidavits is provided in Rule 56(c),
their utility has been cut off in some circuits by current judicial doctrine. E.g., Arnstein
v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), 55 YALE L. J. 810 (1946). For an estimate of the
current judicial climate, see Kennedy, The Federal Summary Judgment Rulc-Some Re-
cent Developyens, 13 BnoonYx L. REv. 5 (1947).
Anticipation of the use of depositions in motions for summary judgment is expressed
in RAGLA&D, DIScOVERY BEFORE TRIAL, 216 (1932); 2 MOOrE, FEDERAL PRAcrC 2445
(1st ed. 1938) ; DYER-SmrII, FEDERAL EXA~mnATbox Brroa TRIA. § 21 (1939).
12. See generally 2 MooaR, FEDERAL PRAcrcE 2438-40 (1st ed. 1933).
An instructive comparison to the Federal Rules can be had from an examination of
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grant broad license to inquire into any matter "not privileged" which is "rel-
evant to the subject matter" of the suit. 3 The procedure for taking deposi-
tions is simple and informal. Information obtained need not be admissible
as evidence. The function of discovery is served as soon as both parties have
equal access to the facts and have had a chance to unearth any evidence they
might otherwise have missed.14 Though a plaintiff cannot take depositions in
order to discover a cause of action,1 he is permitted to amend his complaint
on the basis of facts he has discovered by deposition. 1'
These broad deposition provisions were designed to achieve the goals at-
tained in jurisdictions employing similar rules.17 In those jurisdictions dep-
ositions proved effective in ascertaining truth and preventing perjury by
permitting the taking of testimony from witnesses while their memories were
still fresh and before coaching by counsel. Facts otherwise difficult to prove
were made available in a simple, convenient and inexpensive way. Parties
were educated in advance of trial as to the value of claims and defenses. This
in turn expedited the disposal of litigation, saving the time of the courts, and
the deposition provisions in New York State, for into its courts flow all types of litigation
including a sizeable number of stockholders' suits and unfair competition cases. Deposi-
tions of parties and witnesses can be taken on the service of notice. However, that notice
must contain a list of the subjects to be questioned into. The deponent can move to have
the notice vacated or modified, necessitating a court ruling as to the scope of the examina-
tion. The deposition is limited to matters "material and necessary in the prosecution or
defense of the action." Courts in at least one department have determined this to mean
that parties can only be questioned as to matters on which the examiner has the burden of
proof. Depositions of non-party witnesses can be taken only under circumstances showing
a need to perpetuate their testimony. Depositions by notice cannot call for the production
and inspection of documents. DAWSON, EXAMINATIONS BEFORE TRIAL IN SrTAx CouRTS
4-17 (Practising Law Institute, Trial Practice Series No. 5, 1946).
Since 1936 the Judicial Council of New York has recommended a liberalization
through legislative amendment of pre-trial examination. Two goals have been sought:
one, to permit free examination of the parties to learn their cases fully with no burden
of proof limitation; the other, to permit the production and inspection of documents in
depositions instituted on notice. EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF
NEW YORK 363 (1942). These recommendations have not been adopted. However, a lib.
eralizing trend has been started in the courts, and the recent case of Dorros v. Dorros
Bros., 274 App. Div. 11, 80 N.Y.S.2d 25 (1st Dep't 1948) has removed the burden of
proof limitation on the taking of depositions in commercial cases. See Note, 17 Fon. L.
REv. 288 (1948).
13. Rule 26(b).
14. "That the examination may develop useful information by way of discovery
which may not be admissible or material upon the precise issue is aside from the point;
to the extent that the examination develops useful information it functions successfully
as an instrument of discovery, even if it produces no testimony directly admissible."
Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corp. 27 F. Supp. 946, 947 (D. Conn. 1939).
15. Mebco Realty Holding Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 5 F.R.S. 26a.41, Case 1
(D.NJ. 1942).
16. Conmar Products Corp. v. Lamar Slide Fastener Corp., 5 F.R.S. 26b.31, Case 4
(S.D.N.Y. 1941).
17. Of greatest significance in laying the basis for the new Rules was the study of
state and Canadian provisions for discovery, and the careful evaluation of their operation,
in RAGLAND, DiscovERY BEPORE TRIAL (1932).
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helping to clear the dockets. Furthermore, depositions facilitated the prepara-
tion and trial of cases, preventing surprise at trial, cutting down delays, and
narrowing and simplifying the issues to be tried.18
By abusing the generous examinations permitted under the Rules, however,
parties have prevented the full attainment of these hoped-for goals. The
deposition procedure has often turned into a litigation tactic, designed to
burden opponents with expense, embarrassment or delay-and, if possible,
compel settlement.
DEPOSITION MACHINERY
Under the Rules any party can take depositions, either by oral examination
or by written interrogatories.19 Interrogatories, although useful in saving
travelling expense where the depositions of distant witnesses are necessary,
are not widely used.20 Lawyers prefer oral depositions so they can observe
witnesses' reactions and follow through immediately on any new line of evi-
dence which may be opened.2 '
18. 2 IooRs, FEDEmu PRAcricE 2443-4 (1st ed. 1938); Meirtens, Depositions and
Discovery in Florid& -under the Federal Rules, 1 U. OF FL". L. RE. 149, 151 (1948). Many
of these goals were quicdy realized. See BoDIo, STmxR=Y AND TwcnxiguE OF Dsrosi-
TIONS 30 (Practising Law Institute, Trial Practice Series Monograph No. 5, P..I.
1946).
19. Rule 26(a).
20. In 1941 only 4.79o of 545 depositions studied in New York were taken on written
interrogatories. STocxm=w, op. cit. supra note 7, at 33.
Over a four-and-a-half year period, only one of the depositions transcribed by a
stenographic reporter in New York for use in distant forums -was taken on written in-
terrogatories. His records show:





















* On written interrogatories.





















21. Depositions by written interrogatories (Rule 31) are to be distinguished from in-
terrogatories to parties (Rule 33). The former type are generally directed toward wit-
nesses who are distant from the locale of the action; they assume many of the attributes
of oral depositions, including oral testimony and cross examination-the difference being
that the stenographic reporter poses the questions instead of counsel for either party. The
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Depositions by oral examination can be taken with no more formality than
the serving of a notice on all parties.22  The notice states only the time and
place of the deposition and does not include the subject matter to be investi-
gated. 23 It can be served at any time after the commencement of the action,
except that a plaintiff cannot serve notice without leave of court until twenty
days have expired from the filing of his complaintYa
The scope of examination is virtually unlimited.25 Only matters which are
"privileged" under the applicable common-law and statutory rules of evidence
are specifically excluded. 20  Otherwise the proponent may inquire into any-
thing "relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action." Al-
though courts have sometimes ruled certain areas of examination irrelevant,2 7
latter type, interrogatories to parties, are of primary utility in pinning down the issues
in complex actions where broad allegations are used in the complaint. They may be used
independent of, and in addition to, depositions. They have inherent disadvantages for the
proponent in that they permit studied, carefully phrased answers which may often evade
the main thrust of the questions. Furthermore, interrogatories to parties provide pro-
tections for the deponent which are not available in practice when oral examinations are
taken: the deponent has time to figure out evasions to questions on later interrogatories,
so that the proponent cannot effectively follow up leads to evidence; the deponent can
object to questions before he must answer them; and the number of interrogatories cau
be limited by court order if they will entail too much expense for the deponent. For a
critical evaluation of interrogatories under Rule 33, see Caskey & Young, Some Further
Comments upon Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 33 VA. L. Rv. 125
(1947).
22. Rule 30(a).
23. E.g., United States ex rel. Edelstein v. Bru;sell Sewing Machine Co., 3 F.R.D.
87 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
24. Rule 26(a). Rule 33 permits depositions to be taken even though interrogatories
have been answered, and vice versa, subject to protective orders upon motion to the
court. See Howard v. States Marine Corp., 1 F.R.D. 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (scope of
deposition after interrogatories limited); Currier v. Currier, 6 F.R.S. 33.61, Case 1
(S.D.N.Y. 1942) (interrogatories prohibited after depositions had been taken).
As originally adopted, the Rules provided that notice could not be served until the
defendant served his answer, without leave of court. This was replaced by the 20 day
rule in the 1948 amendments. See note 73 infra and accompanying text.
25. The 'most renowned dispute as to limitations on the scope of depositions sur-
rounds Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), wherein statements of witnesses obtained
by counsel prior to the institution of the action were held to be outside the proper scope
of examination in the absence of showing "good cause". The extent to which scope is
limited in this direction is not yet fully resolved. An excellent survey of the recent
ramifications of the decision in Hickman, v. Taylor is contained in Note, 62 H-Anv. L.
Rxv. 269 (1948). See Discovery Procedure Symposiun, 5 F.R.D. 403 (1946).
General surveys of the limitations on scope of examination are to be found in Kocil,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 30-40; Mehrtens, Depositions and Discovery in Florida under the
Federal Rules, 1 U. oF FLA. L. Rxv. 149, 165-73 (1948) ; Holtzoff, op. cit. supra note 5,
at 208-9; Pike & Willis, Federal Discovery in Operation, 7 U. or Cni. L. Ruv. 297
(1940); Note, 50 YALE L. J. 708 (1941).
26. Engl v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 139 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1943) (doctor-patient privi-
lege).
27. United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Committee, 75 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. La.
1948) (motion to prevent defendant's taking depositions of Attorney General and U.S.
Attorney in order to show that antitrust suit was not filed in good faith granted) ; Camp.
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on the whole they have given "relevant" the broadest definition.es
Rule 80(b) authorizes limitations on the scope of the proposed examina-
tion if the person whose deposition is to be taken can show that it will other-
wise lead to "annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression". However, orders
limiting the examination have been issued only occasionally2 and, in general,
are hard to obtain.30 This is especially true where the prospective deponent
and the court can only guess what the exact scope of examination wiU be.31
Even where the proposed scope is known, the prerequisites for obtaining a
protective order are difficult to establish 3 2 Courts tend to instruct applicants
to move for an order only if an abuse occurs during the actual taking of the
deposition3m
The deponent can seek a protective order during the taking of the deposi-
tion under Rule 30(d) when it appears that the questioning is being conducted
in bad faith, or "in such a manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or
oppress."-34 Here, too, it is difficult to get adequate protection. Proving the
bell v. American Fabrics Co., 2 F.R.D. 204 (E.D.N.Y. 1942) (motion to inspect and
copy accounts and records not material or relevant to the issues: denied). In at least one
instance courts have been more ready to limit examinations than the Rules seem to have
contemplated: Blumenthal v. Lukacs, 5 F.R.S. 26b.31, Case 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) ("highly
conjectural" that matters sought relate to the issue; "relevancy to the issue is still the
test").
28. fackerer v. New York Central R.R., 1 F.R.D. 408 (E.D.N.Y. 1940) ("matters
generally bearing on the issue!'); Lavereet v. Continental Briar Pipe Co., 25 F.Supp. 80
(E.D.N.Y. 1938) ("broadest type of examination"). For examples of the scope of ex-
amination permitted see Bloomer v. Sirian Lamp Co., 8 F.R.S. 26b.31, Case 3 (D. Del.
1944) (stockholders' suit for dissolution-examination of voluminous transactions per-
mitted to unearth possible evidence of mismanagement).
29. Bevemet Metas, Ltda v. Gallie Corp., 7 F.R.S. 34.41, Case 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)
(where sufficient time and opportunity to obtain a full examination had been provided,
motion for continuation of deposition denied; e-aminer would not be "materially aided") ;
Heiner v. North American Coal Corp, 7 F.R.S. 26b21, Case 1 (W.D. Pa. 1942) (scope
of deposition limited upon sufficient showing of oppression: repetition, expense and delay).
30. Even where the face of the complaint raises serious doubts as to the merits of the
suit, and despite the fact that depositions will be long and expensive for the defendant,
motions to limit examination have been denied. E.g., Piccard v. Sperry Corp., 30 F. Supp.
171 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (minority stockholder's suit; plaintiff holder of 110 voting trust
certificates out of a total of 2,015,565; other certificate holders had declined joining in the
action).
31. E.g., Hirsch v. Glidden Co., 79 F. Supp. 729, 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). "It is
difficult at this time to place any definite bounds on the examination, other than to say
that it should be confined to the issues in the case, and not be allowed to drift into e-
traneous matters having no relevance to the issues involved."
32. Courts have required that in order for annoyance, embarrassment and op-
pression to be grounds for a protective order, they must be "unreasonable." E.g., Applica-
tion of Zenith Radio Corp., 4 F.R.S. 30b.21, Case 1 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
33. E.g., French v. Zalstem-Zalessky, 3 F.R.S. 45d.5, Case 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1940);
Krier v. Muschel, 29 F.Supp. 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
34. Protective orders may issue as late as during a pre-trial conference, w':here courts
may also order that depositions be taken. Monarch Liquor Corp. v. Schenley Distillers
Corp., 5 F.R.S. 26b21, Case 2 (N.D.N.Y. 1941). See Ulrich v. Ethyl Gasoline Corp.,
2 F.R.D. 357 (W.D. Ky. 1942) (ordering compliance with subpoena duces Iecum);
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requisite bad faith is difficult.35 Past practice has shown that even if pro-
tective orders are obtained, they usually treat limitations on scope gingerly z°
These orders at best have been compromises, doing little more than softening
the blow for the deponent.3T
Within the scope of any limiting order a deponent must answer the ques-
tions put to him during a deposition, even though the evidence as such may
be inadmissible.38 Counsel can object to admissibility, but objections are
merely noted by the stenographer, and become effective only if the deposition
is offered at trial 39
When, however, the questions are felt to be unfair or outside the reason-
able area of examination, the deponent may attempt to protect himself by re-
fusing to answer. Under Rule 37 the proponent of the question can then
either complete the examination as to other matters, or adjourn, and apply for
a court ruling on the question. Judges find it difficult to determine the rele-
vance of such questions when presented out of context. They are inclined to
order the question answered subject to a later ruling if the answer is offered
at trial. The proponent thereby gains entry into possibly long and fruitless
avenues of inquiry far from the subject matter of the litigation, or into dam-
aging unrelated matters or secrets to which he is not entitled. The likelihood
of an adverse ruling, the delay involved, and the probable liability for all the
expenses of the trip to court, have discouraged deponents from seeking self-
protection by refusing to answer questions they consider improper.
40
Fairwater Transportation Co. v. Chris-Craft Corp., 1 F.R.D. 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (order
for production of documents and limiting scope of deposition).
35. See Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Jasspon, 13 F.R.S. 30d.31, Case 1 (S.D,N.Y.
1949).
36. See Heiner v. North American Coal Corp., 3 F.R.D. 63 (W.D.Pa. 1942) (scope
and relevancy impossible to determine; "rely on the ethics and judgment of counsel").
37. See Folley Amusement Holding Corp. v. Randforce Amusement Corp., 4 F.R.S.
26b.31, Case 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) ("a reasonable time prior to July, 1934"; "not proper that
moving defendants should be required to produce all books, records, documents, contracts,
and other papers, but only such as are relevant to the inquiry").
38. As to the application of rules of evidence to depositions see Pike, The New Fed-
eral Deposition--Discovery Procedure and the Rules of Evidence, 34 ILL L. Rrv. 1
(1939). As an example of matters which may be inquired into which would be ex-
cluded at trial see Orgel v. McCurdy, 12 F.R.S. 26b.31, Case 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (liability
insurance in automobile injury action).
39. Rules 26(e) and 30(c).
40. Furthermore, once the court has ordered the deponent to answer, even though
the deponent feels that the answer will improperly prejudice him, he has no more choice
in the matter. Continued refusal can be punished as contempt or by the application of
special sanctions fatal to his claims or defenses. These include: an order that the matters
about which the questions are asked be taken to be established for the purposes of the
action as claimed by the adverse party; an order refusing to allow the disobedient party
to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or to introduce designated evidence;
an order striking out pleadings, dismissing the action, or giving judgment by default;
and an order for the arrest of the disobedient party. Rule 37(b) (2).
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DEPOSITIONS iN OPERATIo.- ;"
In the majority of cases the discovery machinery provided under the Fed-
eral Rules is not abused. However, the nature of the cases themselves more
often explains this absence of abuse than any safeguard inherent in the
Rules. ' Abuse, when it does occur, generally appears in complex litigation
41. This section is largely based on practical difficulties involved in the preparation
of cases for trial, which by their very nature cannot be documented. Insofar as possible
general statements on the operation of depositions are supported by statistical data, but
in studying these it should be remembered that statistics are difficult to gather in such
a field, and even once gathered only show small facets of the overall picture. Averages
and median figures will give some indication of the general operation of depositions but
show little of the frequency and character of non-average cases -where the difficulties out-
lined in this section arise. These cases can only be determined from specific exnples.
There have been two important empirical studies in the field. Best known, and still
heavily relied on, is RAGLAND, DiscovEaY BEFORE TRIAL (1932). It is a careful statisti-
cal study of the use of depositions for discovery in many state jurisdictions. The study
was probably the main basis for the inclusion of unlimited depositions in the Federal
Rules. But Ragland's work, a sound combination of statistics and the e.\perience of the
bench and bar, was published in 1932, and is largely inapplicable as far as the use of
depositions under the Federal Rules is concerned. The other study is the extremely
thorough statistical survey of the operation of the Federal Rules conducted by Mr. Abram
Stockman for the New York Law Society in 1942: So~m ST,%s1sTcAL OnscvATo,.s o-
THE OPERATION OF DIscovaRY AND RELATED PROVISIONS OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CrvIL
PRocEDuRE (unpublished, 1942). The only known copy of this paper is in the files of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Supreme Court Building, Washing-
ton 13, D.C. The study is based on cases in the Southern District of New York and
therefore includes a large number of cases under the Jones Act, 41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46
U.S.C. § 688 (1946). These cases, seaman's injury actions, present a special need for
depositions because of the frequent unavailability of plaintiff and witnesses. Because these
actions are limited to shipping areas, and because the problems of the type considered in
this comment as they apply to Jones Act cases are in the main similar to negligence
actions, no special treatment is given to them here. A critical discussion of the Jones
Act is to be found in Comment, 57 YA.E L.J. 243 (1947).
42. The incidence and nature of depositions has changed a considerable degree since
the Rules were first drafted. Ragland's figures (see note 41 jupra) indicated that the
overwhelming use of depositions was in automobile injury cases and in other type actions
in which the very narrowness of the issues and the prescribed fact situations automatically
limited the scope and expense of depositions. Although the use of depositions in these
actions today is still heavy, the ratio of these to more complex cases ith wealthier parties
and less limited issues has declined. Thus if Ragland's figures gave the drafters of the
Rules a sense that on the whole the taking of depositions could not be burdensome and
expensive because of their automatically limited scope in the type cases in which they are
most generally used, there is ground for a readjustment of viewpoint.
Ragland's figures show the use of discovery (including interrogatories as well as
depositions) in Wisconsin state court actions in 1932. As to depositions themselves these
figures must be considered only as indicating the general ratio. The comparative 1948
figures show the use of depositions alone.
Cases in which Depositions are Taken
1932-f 1948 (D. Conn.)* 1948 (S.D.AN.Y.)
Automobile Accident 45 14 3
Contract 13 28 24
Negligence other than automobile 8 28 411
Fraud 7 4 1
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where the resources of time, money and counsel make it practicable as a litiga-
tion tactic.
Expense43
Large expense in depositions can be a double-barreled evil: it is per sc re-
pugnant to the principle of just, speedy and inexpensive determination of






Assault and Battery 1
Cancellation of Deed 1





Stockholders' Suit 2 4
Statutory Causes of Action*** 8 21
Other 2
100 100 100
t RAGLAND, DiscovERY BzFxoa TRIAL 28 (1932).
* Actual count from Civil Dockets, covering all cases in D. Conn. docketed from Aug.
29, 1946, to Oct. 16, 1948, and even numbered cases docketed in S.D.N.Y. from Sept. 23,
1946, to Dec. 19, 1946. Connecticut figures have been doubled to facilitate comparison.
* Inapplicable to federal courts.
** Inapplicable to state courts.
*** Including suits under Fair Labor Standards Act, Employers' Liability Act, and
Selective Service Act.
ff Including 23 seamen's actions.
43. The item of expense here considered relates only to the costs usually borne by
any party whose deposition is taken. A special problem arises when depositions are
taken of experts and specialists who have been hired by one of the parties, because of the
inequity of allowing the other side to get expert assistance without having to pay for it.
The confusion surrounding Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), see note 25 supra,
has precipitated a distinct split among the courts as to whether one party can examine
another party's experts. Note, 62 HA.v. L. REv. 269 (1948). When depositions of ex-
perts are allowed, the soundest suggestion seems to be to make the examining party share
the expense of the expert's fee. Note, 50 YALE L.J. 708, 710 (1941).
44. Ragland's figures in 1932 indicated that depositions were inexpensive items in the
cost of litigation. He computed the average cost of transcribing depositions to be about
$15.00, and reported that the highest cost for a deposition he had yet discovered was $66,60,
RAGLAND, DiscovzRY BEFORE TRIAL 172 (1932). Prices everywhere have of course risen
since then. In 1941, using Stockman's figures, the average appears to have been about
$80.00. STOCKMAN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 35. Taking into account the rise in rates for
stenographic reporting, the cost today based on Stockman's figures would probably be at
least ten or twenty dollars higher. A superficial spot-check of reporters' bill-files today
indicates the average to be somewhere over $130, but it is doubtful if such a check can pro-
duce accurate figures.
The range of costs produces startling figures, for it indicates that depositions can be
quite expensive in certain types of cases. One stenographic reporter notes that he has
transcribed depositions in a dozen stockholders' suits where the cost ran from $1000 to
$5000 apiece. He reports two extreme stockholders' suits where the bills for transcriblng
the depositions were $20,000 and $25,000.
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der the threat of taking depositions which the adverse party can ill afford.
For the expense of depositions is not limited to the examiner. Although he
usually must pay the cost of transcribing the examination, the deponent pays
for his own copies, for his counsel, and for the expense of being away from
his work.
In the largest mass of cases-personal injury actions and simple commer-
cial cases-the narrowness of the facts which may be inquired into keeps the
cost of taking depositions low.45 Furthermore, plaintiffs are often impecuni-
ous and want to avoid non-essential expenses, while defendants do not desire
to preserve the testimony of opposing witnesses.Y3 Moreover, because of the
volume of cases handled by the negligence and commercial bars in many cities,
preparation for trial is usually minimized. The greatest emphasis is placed on
handling witnesses before a jury.47 Opposing counsel frequently arrive at
tacit agreements not to use the deposition procedure unless absolutely neces-
sary.
The expense of depositions becomes an abusive factor where one party is
in a position to create a burdensome expense for the other party without fear
of the cost to himself. This situation arises, for example, where the examin-
ing party is wealthy and the deponent not, or where one party has so few
facts that he has little fear of retaliatory depositions. Expense created under
these circumstances can be used to force the deponent to a settlement not
otherwise possible.
It is in complex commercial cases, such as multistate breach of warranty,
unfair competition, and antitrust actions, that the expense of depositions may
become unreasonable.48 Where expense is essential to an effective prosecution
or defense of these actions high cost does not prove misuse of the deposition
procedure.49 But it can still be staggering.50 In one private antitrust suit for
45. In 1941, using Stockman's figures, the average cost of depositions in negligence
actions was $38.88. Srocxmix, op. cit. supra note 7, at 35. In terms of pages the con-
trast between simple and complex actions is sharp. The longest deposition Stockman
found in negligence actions was 200 pages, while in contract cases it was 1040 pages. Id.
at note 29. One lawyer reports a stockholder's action deposition over 8000 pages long. In a
private antitrust action the deposition of only one of many witnesses wvas 10,630 pages.
The cost per page is largely controlled by a statutory minimum rate, but a conservative
estimated minimum is about 75 cents for the original and 35 cents per copy. The cost
varies upward with the competence of the reporter and the arrangements made as to how
quicldy transcripts must be supplied.
46. See BoDIN, op. cit. supra note 18, at 28-9.
47. Despite all these factors, in 1941 depositions were taken in 47.9% of negligence
actions and 43.27o of contract actions, as opposed to an overall 31.8% (see note 9 supra)
for all types of cases. S-oc= AN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 27.
48. Expense does not appear to be a matter of abuse in patent cases, where dep-
ositions are generally put to good use. In these cases they are especially valuable to
defendants, for they provide an opportunity to learn all the facts surrounding the patent
in dispute from the patentee-plaintiff. They are also widely used to establish the af-
firmative defenses of prior use or prior sale, for the witnesses necessary to establish these
are usually spread across the country and would in many cases be hard to produce at trial.
49. This, in fact, is the usual answer to any question about the expense of depositions.
See. for examule. the answer of Judge Kennedy of the Eastern District of New York to
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treble damages the cost of merely transcribing the testimony of one key witness
ran over $20,000. To this must be added the cost of counsel for each side plus
the cost of the witness' absence from his business. Complexity of the material
and the hard feelings which give rise to freqeunt wrangles may require a master
to supervise the depositions, adding several hundred dollars a day to the cost.
The bulk of the testimony may be so great that lawyers must be assigned to
work full-time digesting the testimony in order to get it down to workable
length.5 '
The expense of depositions may be exploited most easily in suits such as
derivative stockholders' actions.52 Here, of course, the availability of evidence
the question of expense in a discussion before the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York: "Q: Isn't the deposition procedure turning out to be a very expensive pro-
cedure? In other words, you are travelling all over the lot. A judge hesitates very
much to say that testimony is irrelevant and immaterial, and the result is you spend weeks
and months sometimes in a deposition. ....
"JUDGE KENNEDY: . . . The objection of expense I find difficult in meeting,
except to say this: that it is unlikely that a case could be as protracted and as involved
as the one you put, unless a lot of money is involved in it. If a lot of money were in-
volved in it, the lawyer would be very happy to travel around taking depositions."
KENNEDY, DIscovFRY PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE FEDERAL AND STATE CouRTs 31-2 (talk
transcribed by the Commerce Reporting Company, April 26, 1949).
50. Not only are 'courts often very strict in saddling a party with an expensive pro-
duction of evidence for discovery purposes, but it has been held that no appeal lies from
the courts' orders no matter how extreme they may be. O'Malley v. Chrysler Corp.,
160 F.2d 35 (7th Cir. 1947). In that case the district judge insisted that the plaintiff's
interrogatories be answered even though the defendant had already spent 90 days and
$10,000 computing statistics requested. Said the judge: "I am not at all interested in
what it cost. If it cost a hundred thousand dollars that doesn't make the slightest dif-
ference to me. I don't want to see you waste your money. But I said I thought they
were entitled to certain information in order to prepare their case for trial." Id. at 42.
It should be possible to have appellate review of extremely unreasonable orders
through one of the discretionary writs. 3 Mooy, FEnrDRAL PRACTICE 1136-S (2d ed. 1948).
51. In those government antitrust suits which include every suspected violator of the
antitrust laws in a particular segment of industry the burden of expense may be com-
pounded in a manner particularly devastating to the small peripheral defendant. Each
defendant must pay his pro rata share for copies of depositions which affect his position
in such a suit. He must provide counsel at all depositions in which there might be need
for cross-examination to clarify points which deal with him. The complexity of proof
may make him liable to extensive questioning not only affecting the merits of the claim
against him but also as to the other parties defendant.
52. Depositions of corporate officers and directors can be long and drawn out. There
are many documents and corporate records which can be called for; discovery to un-
earth leads to evidence can be extended for many days; and the number of officers and
directors of the corporation who can be questioned is large. In one extreme case dep-
ositions were taken five days a week for fourteen months. Not only is the actual expense
of taking the deposition high, but the cost to the corporation of having its executive per-
sonnel absent from their jobs for extended periods of time is heavy.
Plaintiffs do not share the cost of executives being away from their jobs. And by at
least two devices currently in use they escape all other expenses, except for cost of
counsel, who may be retained on a contingent fee basis so that there is no cash ex-
penditure at all. One is an arrangement with the stenographic reporter who transcribes
the deposition, whereby in return for giving the reporter the sizeable business of an ex-
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to a plaintiff from other sources is so limited that depositions are most essen-
tial to successful prosecution. Nonetheless, abuse can arise when the immi-
nence of expensive depositions is used for shake-down purposes by plantiffs
who have no intention of pursuing their suits through to trial.53 The expense
of pre-trial examination in such cases can be so large in comparison to the
recovery sought that settlement would be almost mandatory.54
tended deposition in which a defendant usually orders several copies of the transcript,
the reporter agrees to supply the plaintiff with a copy gratis. The other practice is for
the plaintiff to notify the defendant that the depositions will be taken at times and places
which are highly inconvenient to the defendant, and to threaten to use an incompetent
secretary from counsel's own office; this usually leads to stipulation by the defendant that
it will pay the bills and furnish the reporter. The plaintiff does not have to face much
cost because of the possibility that the defendant may take his deposition in turn, for
there is little that he can be asked except as to the legitimacy of his standing as a stock-
holder.
53. Rule 23 prohibits the settlement of derivative suits without court approval, and
once consent is given the damages involved in the settlement are paid to the corporation
for the benefit of all stockholders. Nonetheless, shakedoxwns are still possible in the in-
flated attorneys' fees which often constitute a substantial part of such settlements. More-
over, the federal courts almost invariably approve proposed settlements. Hornstein,
New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 Co.. L. R v. 1, 22 (1947).
54. One method by which the expense of depositions may be utilized to engineer
settlements can be inferred from situations where stockholders' suits have been brought
simultaneously in the state and federal courts, presumably in order to use the deposition
procedure available under the Federal Rules to aid in the prosecution of the action in the
state court. This becomes unfair when settlements in the state courts are permitted
without the requirement of court approval or notice to all other stockholders necessary
under Rule 23. A plaintiff can combine liberality of deposition-taking with the freedom
to settle out of court contrary to the individual rules of both jurisdictions. Courts have
had their attention called to this situation, but they have not always been scrupulously
careful to prevent it. Compare Bachrach v. General Investment Corp., 31 F.Supp. 84
(S.D.N.Y. 1940) (motion to prohibit taking of depositions granted) and Finkelstein v.
Boylan, 33 F.Supp. 657(S.D.N.Y. 1940) (postponed), with De Seversky v. Republic
Aviation Corp., 2 F.R.D. 183 (E.D.N.Y. 1941) (deposition allowed since sole purpose
not shown to be for use in state courts). See also Empire Liquor Corp. v. Gibson Dis-
tilling Co., 2 F.R.D. 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (deposition permitted; apparent good faith);
Snap Lite Corp. v. Stewart Warner Corp., 40 F. Supp. 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (deposition
prohibited; already refused in pending state court action); Miller-Becker Co. v. Mac-
Gowan, 13 F.R.S. 30b.31, Case 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (deposition permitted; parties and
remedies not the same as in state court action).
In Mottolese v. Kaufman, 13 F.R.S. 30b.31, Case 1 (2d Cir. 1949), stay of a stock-
holder's derivative action was affirmed on the ground that its prosecution at the same
time as a pending state court action on the same cause would unduly burden the de-
fendant. The stay was modified, however, to accommodate the plaintiff's lament that pre-
trial examination under the state practice would be too restricted, The court gave in-
structions that depositions under the Rules be allowed if not satisfactorily afforded in
the state proceeding. The effect of the Mottolese ruling is to allow plaintiffs in de-
rivative actions to bring their suits in states with liberal settlement provisions while
borrowing the unrestricted federal discovery procedure simply by filing a duplicate com-
plaint in the district court. Frequently duplicate actions are brought simultaneously to
protect against plagiarism. Allowing this protection, however, is no justification for the
important corollary of permitting free choice between the most favorable procedural
provisions of the two available forums. Although legitimate stockholders' suits deserve
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The suggestion in Rule 2955 that money could be saved"0 by using office
stenographers instead of official reporters and by not having the stenogra-
pher's notes transcribed unless necessary has not proved to be a workable
economy.57 Probably the only practical saving in general practice is the waiv-
ing of the requirement that the depositions be filed with the clerk of the court,
thus saving the cost of having an additional copy made for that purpose.
Existing sanctions do not appear adequate to prevent deliberate extension
of depositions in order to create expense. Taxing the costs of depositions
against the losing party does not provide an effective check. Courts have
allowed costs where the depositions have been used in evidence, or where they
have dealt with matters directly related to the issues tried."8 But costs do not
loom large in contrast to the stakes involved in cases where violations are apt
the full advantages of liberal procedure, the availability of expensive depositions together
with free rein for irresponsible settlements can only act to encourage suits brought in
bad faith purely for their settlement value.
Settlements are the rule rather than the exception in derivative actions. One large
plaintiff stockholders' law firm in New York has not taken a derivative action on to the
trial stage since the deposition provisions were adopted in the Federal Rules in 1938,
For some indication of what these settlements involve see table of disposition of de-
rivative suits in Hornstein, supra note 53, at 15-17.
55. The Rule provides: "If the parties so stipulate in writing, depositions may be
taken before any person, at any time or place, upon any notice, and in any manner and
when so taken may be used like other depositions."
56. See RAGLAND, DIscovERY BEFoRE TRIAL 172 (1932); 2 MooRa, FEDERAL PRACrCr
2560 (1st ed. 1938).
57. Although office stenographers may be used occasionally for short depositions,
their inability to take notes at more than slow dictation speed and their unfamiliarity
with different voices and consequent requests for repetition make their use for this pur-
pose unsatisfactory. Stenographers' notes sometimes are not transcribed where deposi-
tions are taken only to perpetuate testimony or where a case is settled before trial; much
more frequently they must be transcribed in order to make them available for possible
impeachment of witnesses or for study in preparing for trial and for cross-examination.
58. Rule 54(d) provides for the taxing of costs against the losing party as a matter
of course, subject to a measure of discretion in the trial judge. The inclusion of deposi-
tions in the costs is also up to the discretion of the trial court. Harris v. Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp., 139 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1943) (summary judgment). However,
the local court rules can limit their inclusion to cases in which the depositions are offered
in evidence. Amerman v. Butte Copper & Zinc Co., 9 F.R.S. 26a.71, Case 2 (D. Mont.
1945). Costs of depositions are not taxable as of right. Republic Machine Tool Corp.
v. Federal Cartridge Corp., 9 F.R.S. 26a.71, Case 3 (D. Minn. 1946) (costs refused;
"They did not help anyone else solve any of the issues submitted to the court.").
The cost of depositions has been included where examination was in "fair range of
the issues," Donato v. Parker Pen Co., 9 F.R.S. 26a.71, Case 1 (E.D.N.Y. 1945) ; if not
unreasonable at the time of taking, Quaker Oats Co. v. General Mills, Inc., 7 F.R.S.
26a.71, Case 2 (N.D.Ill. 1943); where "reasonably necessary," even though action dls-
posed of by summary judgment, Curacao Trading Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 7 F.R.S. 26a.71,
Case 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) ; if so stipulated, even though not used at trial, Liebert v.
Netherlands American Steam Navigation Co., 5 F.R.S. 26a.71, Case 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1942);
despite the fact that subsequent pre-trial conference had eliminated need for the deposi-
tions, Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Fruit Growers Service Co., 2 F.R.D. 131 (13.D. Wash.
1941) ; where taking of depositions reasonably necessary, Schmitt v. Continental-Diamond
Fibre Co., 2 F.R.S. 26a.71, Case 1 (N.D. Ill. 1940).
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to occur. Furthermore, punitive costs could not easily be justified as long
as protective orders theoretically are available to prevent abuse. Holding
counsel personally liable for excessive costs might be more effective. The
judicial code already provides for such liability when costs are "unreasonably
and vexatiously" incurred.59 But these tests can be proved only in the most
extreme cases. Sanctions against lawyers who use the threat of ex-pensive
depositions for shakedowns in the form of settlements are limited to disbar-
ment proceedings. Their administration by fellow law\yers is apt to limit ap-
plication to the most blatant violations.
Unnecessary and unreasonable expense should be specifically incorporated
into Rules 30 (b) and (d) as grounds for a protective order. The Advisory
Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure recommended such an amendment
in 1946 but it -was not adopted by the Supreme Court.00 Under the present
Rules, courts have the power to issue protective orders against inordinate ex-
pense, but only on the basis of "annoyance, embarrassment, oppression and
bad faith." These concepts are difficult to measure, and their application has
been narrowly confined. Specific inclusion of "expense" in Rules 30(b) and
(d) should produce more frequent and effective protection.0'
Delay
The breadth of examination permitted under the Rules, together with the
inability of deponents to get protection under Rules 30 and 37, permits examin-
ers to prolong unduly the pre-trial stages of litigation. These delays can be
used either to postpone the other party's depositions or to postpone the trial
itself. Like expense, delay plays an important role primarily in sizeable and
complex suits of the antitrust, breach of contract, and breach of warranty va-
riety.
Delay in the process of taking depositions defeats the purposes of proce-
dural reform. Obviously it hampers speedy disposition of cases. It improperly
encourages settlements by keeping parties away from their normal business
activities. And it gives the examining party an unfair advantage by forcing
the deponent to postpone his preparation for trial.
The more affluent party can create delay by conducting an unnecessarily
broad examination, thereby exerting pressure on his weaker adversary. But
where the strong party is anxious to get to trial, a weaker opponent can also
play the delaying game to advantage-as long as he can afford the time and
expense involved. Since the conduct of the deposition is entirely controlled by
the judgment and manners of counsel, witnesses can hedge and disputes can
arise which would not be possible under the eye of a judge anxious to move
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1948).
60. MooR's FEDER. RuLEs inD On'icLAL Forsts 1118 (1949).
61. Such an amendment would also provide the same standards for the protection of
deponents in oral examinations as exist for parties on whom written interrogatories are
served. Rule 33 provides: ".... The number of interrogatories or of sets of interroga-
tories to be served is not limited except as justice requires to protect the party from
annoyance, expense embarrassment, or oppression...."
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along and get to the point.62 Refusals to answer which necessitate court rul-
ings cause further delays. In long depositions this usually means an adjourn-
ment, preparation of a transcript, and waiting until the judge will hear the
motion. 3
Courts have sometimes taken affirmative action to check these abuses. Ap-
pointment of a master 4 to supervise proceedings has effectively reduced
wrangles between counsel. If vested with the same powers as the trial judge,
the master can rule on objections to questions, thereby saving the time con-
sumed in preparing the record, going to court, familiarizing the judge with
the extent of the examination so far, and obtaining a ruling. 0 Occasionally
a judge himself may supervise the taking of the depositions. He can thus
keep them in bounds and at the same time familiarize himself with the case.00
These arrangements, however, are either expensive in the one case or burden-
some on the courts in the other. There are many cases where the scope of
examination is unreasonable, but not enough so to warrant such costly super-
vision.
62. The deponent can "take the matter under consideration" when requests as to the
identity of relevant documents are made, and make the same evasive answer whenever
such a request is repeated. In one case where a motion was made for the appointment of
a master in order to supervise the conduct of a deposition, one ground for tle motion was
that the deponent had answered questions with "I don't remember" or "I don't recollect"
more than 1800 times in 2000 pages of deposition transcript.
There is no converse motion under Rule 30(b) to protect the examiner from the de-
laying tactics of the deponent. KENNEDY, op. cit. supra note 49, at 33. Apparently only
the appointment of a master can come close to providing an adequate protection when
the deponent decides to hedge.
63. An extreme example of frequent trips to court to settle questions arising out of
the conduct of depositions is Deller v. H. K. Porter Co., Civil No. 38-620 (S.D.N.Y. filed
Nov. 12, 1946), where 28 court orders pertaining to depositions were issued, in the course
of which 13 different judges sat on the various motions.
64. E.g., Laverett v. Continental Briar Pipe Co., 25 F.Supp. 790 (ED.N.Y. 1939);
Hirsch v. Glidden Co., 79 F.Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). In one case the appointment of
a master was not allowed without a showing that the examination was sought in bad faith
or would be conducted with an intent to annoy, embarrass or oppress the deponent.
Michels v. Ripley, 1 F.R.S. 30b.343, Case 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). But this requirement seems
to be unnecessarily strict.
A master may also be appointed to protect the examiner from the misbehavior of the
deponent, and to compel responses to questions. See note 62 .Vpra.
65. An effective order accomplishing these ends in the appointment of a master may
provide for the following powers: (1) To supervise the conduct of the taking of said
depositions, including 'the length thereof; (2) To rule upon all applications for relief
available to and which may be made by any party, during or in connection with the said
depositions under Rules 26 through 37(a), and Rule 45(a) through (d) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
It should further provide that any action taken or ruling made by the Special Master
shall be subject to review by the judge making the appointment upon the application of
any party. Parties are-not likely to abuse this privilege: it is not profitable to annoy the
prospective trial judge.
66. This was done in United States v. Morgan, Civil No. 43-757 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct.
30, 1947) by order of Judge Knox, Feb. 16, 1948. For a discussion of the procedure in
that case see REPoRr OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 10-12 (1948).
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Elimination of these delays requires affirmative corrective measures. Rule
30 might be amended to require leave of court for depositions of more than
five days duration. Power should be vested in the judge to limit the deposition
or to appoint a supervising master when he grants the application." Five days
appears to be the appropriate dividing line. This limitation would affect only
a small percentage of cases. The overwhelming bulk of depositions only rarely
run as long as three or four days. The petition for leave to take the deposition
should state the subject matter for inquiry in order to provide the prospective
deponent with grounds on which to base an argument for limitation. Insofar
as possible the court should issue an order limiting the scope or time length of
the depositions rather than appoint a master, to avoid the extra expense. But
when the proposed scope listed in the application merely restates the allega-
tions in the complaint, appointment of a master may be necessary, for limita-
tion in ad-Vance would be virtually impossible. Many complex actions where
delays and objections may be anticipated are clearly cases within the scope of
Rule 53 authorizing appointment of a master in e-xceptional circumstances, CS
for here courts alone cannot provide adequate supervision. If a master is not
appointed when leave to take the deposition is granted, the court should be
empowered to appoint one on any subsequent motion by either party. 0
Maintaining a roster of standing masters available to supervise depositions
67. This suggestion has many of the advantages and few of the failings of the "pre-
discovery" conference recommended in Commentary, Pre-Trial as to Discovcry, S F.thS.
16266 (1942). The remedy suggested there was a pre-trial conference held at the initial
stage of litigation with the dual function of narrowing the issues and prescribing the scope
of discovery, thereby avoiding unnecessary expense and delay. Such a solution appears
impracticable as an effort to simplify issues since the parties would not yet be sufficiently
apprised of the facts to be-able to evaluate their claims and defenses. Furthermore, it
would not prove satisfactory in determining the scope of examination in cases where the
need for limiting scope appears only after depositions have been instituted.
68. Rule 53(b) provides that reference to a master "shall be the exception and not
the rule."
69. This method of eliminating delays might be accomplished by an amendment to
Rule 30 similar to the following:
(h) APucAmoN FOR ExAmINATioN OF MORE THAN" Fiv DAYS DuRArxo; AxronIT-
MENT OF MASTMR.
A party desiring to take the deposition of any person by oral examination which will
have a duration of longer than five days shall apply to the court for leave to take the
deposition. The application shall state the time and place for taking the deposition and
the subject matter to be examined into. Reasonable notice in writing of the time set for
hearing the application, together with a copy thereof, shall be served on all parties. The
court after hearing such application may make any order provided for in subdivision (b) ;
or may order limitation of the scope or the duration of the proposed deposition or both;
or may appoint a master to supervise the examination, with power to rule on all matters
arising under Rules 26 through 37(a), and Rule 45(a) through (d). Any action taken or
ruling made by the master shall be subject to review by the court upon the application of
any party, and the cost of the master shall be borne by the party making application for
leave to take the deposition, subject to being taxed as costs at the discretion of the court
under Rule 54(d). The court may appoint a master to supervise the examination at any
subsequent motion of any party or of the deponent.
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in busy jurisdictions would facilitate elimination of delays and other abuses
arising from the present unrestricted scope of examination. The cost of the
master should be borne initially by the party making application to take the
deposition, subject to being taxed as costs of litigation. Imposing this cost
would cool the enthusiasm of a party seeking to use the expense of extended
depositions to force a settlement where he does not really intend to carry his
case on to trial.
Order of Taking Depositions
The abuses of expense and delay are accentuated when one party gains the
right to take depositions before the other. Since the party who has priority is
usually entitled to complete his depositions before the deponent can take his
in turn, the examiner can tie the deponing party down to his story while se-
curing the material and time to coach his own witnesses effectively. In those
cases where depositions are short the effect of priority is not very great.70
Priority, however, becomes an extremely important tactical advantage when
depositions are extended.7 1
As originally adopted, the Rules provided that without leave of court nei-
ther party could serve notice of a deposition before issue was joined.72 This
provision enabled the defendant to gain priority in the taking of depositions
for almost as long as he liked by serving notice along with his answer. More-
over, whatever delays he could create before filing his answer would protect
him that much longer from the plaintiff's depositions.73 The Rules have since
been amended.7 4 Today a plaintiff can serve his notice to take depositions
twenty days after the institution of the action, and a defendant can serve his
notice at any time.75 While no longer able to secure any advantage by delay-
ing his answer, a defendant can still gain priority by serving his notice during
the twenty day period of grace.
Courts generally grant absolute priority to whichever party serves his no-
tice for depositions first.76 While not inflexible, this rule is so well established
70. In the majority of cases few depositions are taken. In over 80% of the 1941 cases
in New York in which depositions were sought of parties the deposition of only one person
was taken. When depositions were sought of persons other than parties, 60.8% of plain-
tiffs and 55.67o of defendants took no more than two. STOCKMAN, op. Cit. Stpra note 7,
at 32.
71. KocH, op. cit. .rupra note 2, at 20.
72. Leave to take depositions before the answer has been served usually has been re-
fused. E.g., Munson Line v. Green, 6 F.R.D. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1946) (plaintiff alleged that
defendant would serve notice with his answer thereby gaining a priority which would be
used for delay).
73. MooRe'S FEDERAL RuZXS AND OFFIcIAL Foams 1108 (1949).
74. Ibid. The amendments took effect March 19, 1948.
75. Rule 26(a). A recent case under the amended Rule shows a more liberal approach
to the "leave of court" exception than heretofore. Keller-Dorian Colorfilm Corp. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 13 F.R.S. 26a.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (leave to serve notice of deposi-
tions along with complaint upheld; defendant already represented by counsel).
76. E.g., Shamokin Woolen Mills v. Cortille Fabrics, 4 F.R.S. 30b.33, Case I
(S.D.N.Y. 1941); Bough v. Lee, 1 F.R.S. 30b.33, Case 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Grauer v.
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that an alert party can gain an advantage which he can combine with an over-
extensive use of depositions to harass the adverse party.7 T A matter of a few
hours' difference in serving notices may mean the granting of the right to take
uninterrupted depositions for many months38
Mere diligence of parties in serving notice should not determine the order
of taking depositions. Where disputes over priority arise, courts should allow
counsel to suggest feasible arrangements for taking turns in their examina-
tions. The inequitable advantages of priority should be eliminated by order-
ing parties to stagger the taking of depositions."
Use of an alternating scheme in taking depositions should cut down un-
necessary expense and delay.80 Both the possibility of immediate reprisals
and the inability to gain advantage from postponing the other party's deposi-
tions will act to remove much of this abuse. Furthermore, such an arrange-
Schenley Products Co., 26 F.Supp. 768 (S.D.N.Y. 1938). Priority on the basis of dili-
gence is not inflexible and has been defeated where special circumstances have e.-sted:
Kenealy v. Texas Co., 29 F.Supp. 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (defendant served notice first,
plaintiff defaulted and subsequently served his notice; priority to plaintiff, defendant's
remedy for default lies under Rule 37(d)). Contra, on similar facts: Producers Releasing
Corp. de Cuba v. P.R.C. Pictures, 8 F.R.D. 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
77. Priority cannot be defeated on the ground that arrangements have previously been
made by the other party for taling depositions, or that the depositions will clear up a dis-
pute as to jurisdiction, ,fodigliani Glass Fibers v. Glasfloss Mfg. Co., 7 F.R.D. 647
(E.D.N.Y. 1948) ; nor by motions by the adverse party challenging the sufficiency of the
complaint, Hillside Amusement Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 5 F.RLS. 30b.33, Case I
(S.D.N.Y. 1942).
78. In one case notice was served by the defendant in late afternoon and by the plain-
tiff the very next morning. The defendant was granted priority to take depositions e-
pected to last well over a year.
79. Rule 30(b) should be amended to allow the issuance of protective orders govern-
ing the order of taling depositions. The Rule should include a provision similar to the
following: ".. . or that the order of taldng depositions shall be fairly divided between
the parties... !' In considering possible arrangements for an equitable division courts
will have to rely on suggestions made by counsel. The factors vary too much in each
case to justify a fixed rule. Order might be established on the basis of who has the burden
of proof as to each matter sought to be explored. Under this test the e.-mmination of each
witness once begun should not be cut off immediately after the affirmative matter has been
inquired into, if there are other matters on which the witness can testify, unless the addi-
tional matter would unreasonably extend the deposition. Order might be determined on
the basis of separate allegations, permitting one party to take depositions first and then
the other. This assumes, of course, that the evidence supporting or rebutting each allega-
tion can be easily segregated from evidence necessary to other allegations. It assumes
further that witnesses will not have to be recalled to answer questions as each allegation
is inquired into. Where the depositions will be of approximately equal length, the order
may be staggered by allowing one party to take the deposition of a witness and then the
other party to take the deposition of a different witness. Order could also be determined
in units of time, allowing one party to take depositions for a week or a month and then
allowing the other party to take depositions for a like period. The unit of time, however,
should not be so inflexible that it would necessitate cutting off a deposition before it is
completed.
80. Staggering the taking of depositions evenly is not practicable where one party
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ment will permit the preparation for trial by both parties to go ahead at an
even pace. It will remove much of the opportunity for coaching witnesses on
the basis of what has been learned from the opposing party's case.
Improper Scope
The virtually unrestricted examination under Rule 26 permits malicious, as
well as over-extended, questioning. The abuse can take various forms. It can
consist of a long series of annoying questions used to harry the deponent. It
can involve a probing into personal matters possessing a blackmail value. Or
it can be used to gather valuable trade secrets from the deponent. Whatever
the form, the possibility of abuse is created by the inadequacy of protective
orders and the inefficacy of self protection through refusal to answer im-
proper questions.
A clever examiner can pose a string of improper questions which are in-
dividually not serious enough to merit a deponent's refusing to answer, con-
sidering the expense and delay of a trip to court. The cumulative effect of
these, however, can constitute a vigorous bullying campaign. Such tactics are
available in cases like stockholders' suits, where plaintiff's information comes
from corporate insiders. A defendant can worry the plaintiff with questions
about the source of his information and about the basis on which his counsel
is retained. Under such circumstances Rule 30 (d) cannot protect a deponent,
since its requirement of bad faith is too difficult to establish.
Blackmail material can be uncovered not only by probing into embarrassing
personal matters,"' but also by unearthing other causes of action against the
deponent. Though not directly of use to the examiner, the information may
be troublesome if revealed to third persons.8 2 Discovering such matters gives
the examiner a bludgeon to force settlement or withdrawal of the action.
seeks considerably more depositions than the other. The ratio of depositions sought varies
with the type of case.
Depositions take; of Persons other than Parties (1941)
By Plaintiff By Defendant By Both
Jones Act 27.9% 44.1% 27.9%
Negligence 59.7 31.9 8.3
Contract 60.0 24.2 14.2
These figures include depositions sought of corporate employees where the corporation
was a party. The percentage of depositions which were taken of corporation employees
was over 50% in Jones Act cases, 63.9% in negligence cases, and 68.6% in contract cases.
STOCKMAN, op. cit. smpra note 7, at 31-2.
81. Ragland recognized this possibility primarily in actions for seduction under prom.
ise of marriage and for malicious prosecution. RAGLAND, DiscoVxRY BEF0Ro TRIAL 31
(1932). His solution was to prevent the publication of the results of the examination.
Id. at 30. But this solution does not avail much where the mere fact that the knowledge
is in the hands of the other party is enough to create a threat.
82. As to how this might arise, see Checker Cab Mfg. Corp. v. Checker Taxi Co., 3
F.R.D. 228 (D. Mass. 1943). There the defense to a contract action was that the contract
was void because it violated the antitrust laws. In permitting examination into plaintiff's
possible violation of these laws the court endeavored to protect the plaintiff by limiting the
use of the information: "As the inquiry seems to be a rather searching one, and since it is
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One potentially serious abuse is the extraction of trade secrets not essential
to the action at the deposition stage. This possibility is most likely to material-
ize in patent infringement suits. Although in many patent cases the offending
product is on the market and freely accessible to anyone, in others the alleged
infringement relates to secret chemical processes or the methods and machin-
ery of manufacture. The patentee-plaintiff usually brings the infringement
action against a competitor. Extraction of trade secrets from that competitor
could well provide the patentee with an unfair business advantage, whether he
wins or loses the infringement action. Although the extent to which patentees
exploit this advantage is necessarily a matter of speculation, patent lawyers
fear that the discovery of secret processes may be improperly used to jeopardize
their clients' business status.
Courts have not been consistent in dealing with the protection of trade se-
cretsYs 3 Sealed answers, one of the protective measures authorized by Rule
30(b) have seldom been ordered for the purpose.8 In order to gain what pro-
tection they can counsel generally instruct witnesses not to answer questions
concerning trade secrets unless ordered to by the court under Rule 37.
Elimination of the abuses of improper scope can be accomplished primarily
by corrective measures designed to prevent delays in the deposition-taking
process.8  To these should be added changes in the administration of the ex-
isting Rules. To curtail bullying and other improper questioning, protective
orders should be more freely granted. 0 When a deponent has refused to
answer a question which involves a trade secret, courts should change their ap-
proach from one of ordering revelation, subject to final determination if the
answer is presented at trial, to one of protecting the secret, ordering its dis-
being made purely as a matter of defense to an action on a contract, the use of any in-
formation developed through the inquiry is limited strictly to the present case." Id. at
229. But query as to the effectiveness of this attempt at protection.
83. Revelation has been ordered in Cooney v. Guild Company, 3 F.R.S. 26bA6, Case
1 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) ; Radio Receptor Co. v. General Motors Corp., 2 F.R.S. 30b.35, Case
2 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). In other cases the trade secret has been protected, especially vhere
not essential to the case: Hirshhorn v. Mline Safety Appliances Co., 8 FJLD. 11
(W.D.Pa. 1948) (secret research data); Lenerts v. Rapidol Distributing Co., 6 F.R.S.
30b.352, Case 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (hair dye formula).
The definition of what is secret has been strictly construed: Moss v. Aetna Standard
Engineering Co., 11 F.R.S. 30b.352, Case 1 (E.D.N.Y. 1948) (sources of supply for
manufacturing parts not protected).
84. Apparently only one published case has suggested the use of sealed documents to
protect trade secrets from a competitor. Remington Rand v. Control Instrument Co.,
7 F.R.D. 18 (E.D.N.Y. 1947) (drawings and specifications of an invention).
85. Note 69 supra.
86. District judges should not be bound by stingy precedents in issuing protective
orders under Rules 30(b) and (d). If, however, the courts do not liberalize the trend of
these earlier cases of their own accord, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules
should change the language of the Rules to call attention to the desirability of issuing pro-
tective orders more freely. This might be accomplished as simply as by changing the
word "may" to "shall" in 30(b) and (d), or by making the final clause in 30(b) a separate
sentence.
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closure only if it appears necessary at trial.8 7 Finally if there are so many ap-
plications for rulings under Rules 30 (d) and 37 that judges cannot adequately
study the transcript of the depositions, applications might be referred to specially
empowered standing masters.s8
CONCLUSION
The deposition provisions of the Federal Rules have proved their worth in
promoting just settlements and informed preparation for trial. This success,
however, has been marred by abuses: unnecessary expense, delaying tactics,
unfair advantage in taking depositions, and malicious questioning.
Changes should not be advocated without cautious consideration. But the
following corrective measures should eliminate much of the present abuse of
the deposition procedure without defeating its basic purposes:
1. The inclusion of "expense" as a basis for protective orders under Rules
30(b) and (d);
2. An amendment to Rule 30 requiring leave of court for depositions last-
ing more than five days, and permitting the court at its discretion to limit the
scope and/or the length of the deposition, or to appoint a master to supervise
the deposition;
3. Determining the order of taking depositions on grounds other than the
diligence of counsel in serving notice;
4. A greater inclination on the part of courts to sustain deponents tinder
Rule 37 who in good faith refuse to answer questions deemed improper, refer-
ring long transcripts to standing masters.
87. This procedure appears to have been followed in at least one case. Lever Bros.
Co. v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 38 F.Supp. 680 (D.Md. 1941) (chilling process for
Ivory soap need not be revealed unless relevance appears at trial).
88. Reference to a master has been ordered in at least one instance to hear and de-
cide objections to written interrogatories. Valdo Theatre Corp. v. Dandis, 4 F.R.S.
53b.12, Case 1 (D. Me. 1941).
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